Security Audit

ailabs-393/ai-labs-claude-skills:packages/skills/personal-assistant

github.com/ailabs-393/ai-labs-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 1a12bc7aadcc

CRITICAL

Scanned 18 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

ailabs-393/ai-labs-claude-skills:packages/skills/personal-assistant received a trust score of 40/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include File read + network send exfiltration, Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval, Sensitive path access: AI agent config.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 55/100, indicating areas for improvement.

Last analyzed on March 14, 2026 (commit 1a12bc7a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

55%

Static Code Analysis

85%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

100%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

2 findings

Shell Execution

2 findings

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

2 findings

Security Findings3

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
CRITICAL	File read + network send exfiltration AI agent config/credential file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality.	Manifest	packages/skills/personal-assistant/SKILL.md:591
HIGH	Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions.	Manifest	packages/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/task_helper.py:5
HIGH	Sensitive path access: AI agent config Access to AI agent config path detected: '~/.claude/'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared.	Static	packages/skills/personal-assistant/SKILL.md:591

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