Trust Assessment
stakeholder-docs received a trust score of 88/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Missing required field: name, Broad filesystem access permissions declared.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 15, 2026 (commit 1823c3f6). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Missing required field: name The 'name' field is required for claude_code skills but is missing from frontmatter. Add a 'name' field to the SKILL.md frontmatter. | Static | plugins/specweave-docs/skills/stakeholder-docs/SKILL.md:1 | |
| MEDIUM | Broad filesystem access permissions declared The skill declares `Read`, `Glob`, and `Grep` permissions without explicit path restrictions. While the skill's description states it 'reads from `.specweave/docs/internal/`', the declared permissions themselves grant access to the entire filesystem accessible by the agent. This could allow the skill, if manipulated by a prompt injection or if its internal logic is flawed, to read, list, or search arbitrary files outside its intended scope, potentially exposing sensitive information. If the underlying tool implementation supports path-based access control, restrict `Read`, `Glob`, and `Grep` permissions to specific directories (e.g., `.specweave/docs/internal/`) to enforce the intended scope of operation and prevent unintended file access. | LLM | SKILL.md:1 |
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