Trust Assessment
apify-trend-analysis received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Path Traversal via unsanitized output filename.
The analysis covered 4 layers: dependency_graph, manifest_analysis, llm_behavioral_safety, static_code_analysis. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 11, 2026 (commit 0ea3e009). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Path Traversal via unsanitized output filename The `SKILL.md` instructs the LLM to construct a `node` command that includes an `--output` argument for saving results to a file. The filename for this argument is intended to be derived from user preferences. The `reference/scripts/run_actor.js` script, which processes this argument, directly uses the provided `outputPath` (from `values.output`) in a file write operation (implied `writeFileSync` within the truncated `downloadResults` function) without proper sanitization. An attacker could provide a malicious filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../etc/passwd`) to write data to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, potentially leading to data corruption, unauthorized file modification, or even remote code execution if critical system files are overwritten. 1. **In `reference/scripts/run_actor.js`:** Implement robust sanitization for the `outputPath` argument. This should involve validating the filename to ensure it does not contain path separators (`/`, `\`) or directory traversal sequences (`..`). Consider using `path.basename()` to extract only the filename and `path.join()` with a designated, secure output directory to prevent writing outside of it. 2. **In `SKILL.md`:** Instruct the LLM to explicitly sanitize or validate user-provided filenames before constructing the `--output` argument, or clearly communicate to the user that only simple filenames without special characters or path separators are allowed. | Unknown | reference/scripts/run_actor.js:46 |
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