Security Audit

api-bible-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

api-bible-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Generic tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Generic tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation advertises `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This suggests a generic mechanism to execute arbitrary Composio tools. If `run_composio_tool()` can execute any Composio tool without strict sandboxing or permission checks, an attacker could craft a prompt to the LLM to execute tools with excessive permissions (e.g., filesystem access, arbitrary network requests) that are not directly related to 'API Bible operations'. The skill itself does not define or restrict the scope of tools executable via `run_composio_tool()`, making it a potential vector for privilege escalation or unintended actions. Clarify and restrict the scope of tools that can be executed via `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that the underlying Rube MCP environment strictly sandboxes and applies least-privilege principles to any tool executed through this mechanism. If `run_composio_tool()` is intended only for API Bible tools, this should be explicitly stated and enforced, and the tool should ideally be renamed to reflect this specific scope (e.g., `run_api_bible_tool()`).	LLM	SKILL.md:79

Scan History

Embed Code

[![SkillShield](https://skillshield.io/api/v1/badge/54f6c97153eec07a.svg)](https://skillshield.io/report/54f6c97153eec07a)