Security Audit

bestbuy-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

bestbuy-automation received a trust score of 83/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Vague `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` usage may allow excessive tool execution or data exfiltration, Unpinned dependency on Rube MCP.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Vague `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` usage may allow excessive tool execution or data exfiltration The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and 'run_composio_tool()' suggests a flexible execution environment that could potentially allow the execution of any available Composio tool, or even arbitrary code/commands, without clear constraints. If an attacker can manipulate the arguments passed to this function, it could lead to excessive permissions, allowing access to sensitive Bestbuy data or other system resources, and potentially facilitate data exfiltration. The lack of a detailed schema or security boundaries for this operation makes it a significant risk. Provide a detailed schema and clear security boundaries for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Explicitly define what types of operations are permitted, what inputs are sanitized, and what data can be accessed. If it allows arbitrary code or shell commands, this functionality should be restricted or removed.	LLM	SKILL.md:39
MEDIUM	Unpinned dependency on Rube MCP The skill manifest specifies a dependency on the `rube` MCP (`"mcp": ["rube"]`) without any version constraints. This means that any future version of the `rube` MCP, including potentially malicious or vulnerable ones, could be used by this skill. This introduces a supply chain risk as the skill's security is entirely dependent on the ongoing integrity and security of the `rube` MCP. Pin the `rube` MCP dependency to a specific, known-good version or version range to mitigate risks from future malicious or vulnerable updates. Regularly review and update the pinned version.	LLM	SKILL.md

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