Security Audit
bitquery-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
bitquery-automation received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Unpinned MCP Dependency, Potentially Excessive Permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Unpinned MCP Dependency The skill's manifest declares a dependency on the 'rube' MCP without specifying a version. This can lead to supply chain risks if a malicious or vulnerable version of 'rube' is introduced or if breaking changes are deployed, as the skill would automatically use the latest available version without explicit review. Pin the 'rube' MCP dependency to a specific version or a version range in the manifest to ensure stability and mitigate risks from unexpected updates. For example: `"mcp": ["rube@1.2.3"]` or `"mcp": ["rube@^1.0.0"]`. | Static | manifest.json:1 | |
| LOW | Potentially Excessive Permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill exposes the `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool for 'Bulk ops' using `run_composio_tool()`. While intended for legitimate automation, the term 'workbench' and 'bulk ops' can imply broad capabilities. If `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary code execution or access to system resources beyond the scope of Bitquery operations, it could be misused to perform unintended actions or access sensitive data. The exact scope of `run_composio_tool()` is not detailed, making it a potential area for privilege escalation if not properly sandboxed. Clarify the exact scope and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()` in the skill documentation. Ensure that the underlying implementation of `run_composio_tool()` operates within a secure, minimal-privilege sandbox, restricting its access to only what is necessary for Bitquery bulk operations. | Static | SKILL.md:50 |
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