Security Audit

brandfetch-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

brandfetch-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential for Arbitrary Tool Execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential for Arbitrary Tool Execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill recommends using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and the generic `run_composio_tool()` function suggest a broad capability to execute various Composio tools or potentially arbitrary code within the Rube environment. Without explicit restrictions or sandboxing described within the skill, this could lead to excessive permissions, data exfiltration, or command injection if the underlying `run_composio_tool()` is not carefully controlled or if it can be manipulated to execute unintended operations. The skill does not specify any limitations on what `run_composio_tool()` can execute. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If `run_composio_tool()` can execute arbitrary Composio tools, ensure that the agent's permissions are strictly scoped to only necessary Brandfetch operations. Implement strict input validation and sandboxing for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` to prevent command injection or unintended tool execution. Provide examples of how to safely use `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with specific, limited `run_composio_tool()` calls.	LLM	SKILL.md:75

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