Security Audit

brex-staging-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

brex-staging-automation received a trust score of 82/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unpinned dependency in manifest, Vague and potentially excessive permissions via `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Unpinned dependency in manifest The skill manifest specifies a dependency on 'rube' without a version constraint. This allows for automatic updates to potentially malicious or vulnerable versions of the dependency, introducing a supply chain risk. An attacker could compromise the 'rube' dependency to inject malicious code. Pin the dependency to a specific version or version range (e.g., `{"mcp": ["rube@1.2.3"]}` or `{"mcp": ["rube@^1.0.0"]}`).	LLM	SKILL.md
MEDIUM	Vague and potentially excessive permissions via `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` The `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool, particularly when used with `run_composio_tool()`, is described as enabling 'Bulk ops'. This description is vague and could imply the ability to execute arbitrary Composio tools or even arbitrary code, granting the skill overly broad permissions beyond its stated purpose of 'Brex Staging Automation'. This increases the attack surface if the underlying `run_composio_tool()` is not strictly sandboxed or limited. Provide a more specific description of `run_composio_tool()`'s capabilities and limitations. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and only allows execution of explicitly permitted and safe operations, or remove this capability if not strictly necessary for the skill's core function.	LLM	SKILL.md:72

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