Security Audit

callingly-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

callingly-automation received a trust score of 82/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad execution capabilities via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, Unpinned dependency on Rube MCP.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Broad execution capabilities via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill exposes `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This tool, by its name ('workbench') and function (`run_composio_tool()`), suggests the ability to execute arbitrary Composio tools or commands in a potentially unconstrained environment. This could lead to command injection, data exfiltration, or other unauthorized actions if the underlying Composio tools are not strictly sandboxed or if the LLM is prompted to misuse this capability. Restrict the capabilities of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` to only necessary, well-defined operations. Ensure `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and cannot execute arbitrary system commands or access unauthorized files/network resources. Provide clear documentation on its limitations. If possible, avoid exposing such a broad tool to the LLM.	LLM	SKILL.md:62
MEDIUM	Unpinned dependency on Rube MCP The skill manifest declares a dependency on `rube` MCP (`"mcp": ["rube"]`) without specifying a version. This means the skill will always use the latest available version of Rube MCP. This introduces a supply chain risk, as a malicious or buggy update to Rube MCP could automatically be incorporated, potentially leading to unexpected behavior, security vulnerabilities, or breaking changes. Pin the Rube MCP dependency to a specific, known-good version (e.g., `"mcp": ["rube@1.2.3"]`) to ensure deterministic behavior and prevent automatic updates from introducing vulnerabilities. Regularly review and update the pinned version.	LLM	SKILL.md:1

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