Security Audit

chmeetings-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

chmeetings-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Skill exposes highly privileged RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH tool.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Skill exposes highly privileged RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH tool The skill documentation describes the `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool with the capability for 'Bulk ops' and `run_composio_tool()`. This suggests a highly privileged and potentially unconstrained execution environment. If `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary code execution, shell commands, or access to resources beyond the intended scope of Chmeetings operations, it presents a significant risk for command injection (SS-LLM-003), data exfiltration (SS-LLM-002), and excessive permissions. The vague description of its capabilities ('Bulk ops') further raises concerns about its potential for misuse by an LLM or an attacker manipulating the LLM's inputs. Clarify and restrict the capabilities of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary code execution, it should be removed or its scope severely limited to predefined, safe operations. Provide a detailed schema and documentation for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` that clearly defines its inputs, outputs, and security boundaries. Implement strict input validation and sandboxing for any code executed via this tool. Consider if such a powerful, generic execution tool is truly necessary for a specific Chmeetings automation skill; prefer more granular, purpose-built tools.	LLM	SKILL.md:72

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