Security Audit

currents-api-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

currents-api-automation received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation describes the use of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The function `run_composio_tool()` implies the ability to execute arbitrary tools or code within a remote workbench environment. If the arguments passed to `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` or subsequently to `run_composio_tool()` can be influenced by untrusted input (e.g., from user prompts or other LLM outputs), it could lead to command injection. This would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or manipulate the underlying system through the agent's access to the Rube MCP. Ensure that all inputs to `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()` are strictly validated and sanitized. Implement robust sandboxing for the remote workbench environment to limit the impact of any successful injection. The `run_composio_tool()` function should only execute whitelisted tools with predefined, safe parameters, or operate within a highly restricted execution environment that prevents arbitrary code execution or access to sensitive resources.	LLM	SKILL.md:78

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