Security Audit

dnsfilter-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

dnsfilter-automation received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential for arbitrary code execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential for arbitrary code execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill explicitly lists `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and the function name `run_composio_tool()` suggest a capability for executing more complex or arbitrary operations, potentially including code execution, beyond the structured API calls of `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL`. If `run_composio_tool()` allows for arbitrary script execution or shell commands within the Rube environment, an attacker could leverage this tool to perform command injection, data exfiltration, or other malicious activities if they can manipulate the agent's input to this tool. The skill does not provide details on the sandboxing or limitations of `run_composio_tool()`, making its inclusion a significant security concern. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If it allows arbitrary code execution, it should be removed or heavily restricted to specific, safe operations. If it is a sandboxed environment for specific Composio operations, this should be explicitly stated in the documentation to mitigate perceived risk.	LLM	SKILL.md:82

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