Security Audit

docsumo-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

docsumo-automation received a trust score of 76/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Excessive Permissions / Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

70%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
CRITICAL	Potential Excessive Permissions / Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation suggests using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and the function `run_composio_tool()` strongly imply a capability to execute arbitrary code or perform broad, potentially unconstrained operations within the Composio environment. Without strict sandboxing and explicit whitelisting of allowed operations, this tool could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands, access sensitive files, or perform actions beyond the intended scope of the Docsumo toolkit, leading to data exfiltration or system compromise. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that this tool operates within a strictly sandboxed environment, with explicit whitelisting of allowed operations and no direct arbitrary code execution or file system access. If arbitrary code execution is an intended feature, clearly document the security implications, required security controls, and provide guidance on how to mitigate risks for users.	LLM	SKILL.md:70

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