Trust Assessment
dpd2-automation received a trust score of 70/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unpinned External MCP Dependency, Broad Tool Execution Permissions via Rube MCP.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Unpinned External MCP Dependency The skill relies on an external Managed Control Plane (MCP) at `https://rube.app/mcp` without any version pinning or integrity checks. This introduces a supply chain risk where changes to the Rube MCP, whether malicious or accidental, could directly impact the skill's functionality and security without explicit user or developer consent. A compromised Rube MCP could lead to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or other security breaches through the Dpd2 integration. If possible, specify a version or hash for the Rube MCP dependency to ensure deterministic behavior. Implement integrity checks for external dependencies. Consider hosting critical MCP components internally or using a trusted, version-controlled proxy. | Static | SKILL.md:15 | |
| HIGH | Broad Tool Execution Permissions via Rube MCP The skill grants the agent broad permissions to execute 'Dpd2 operations' via the Rube MCP using `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. The skill explicitly states to 'Always search tools first' and then execute any discovered tool. This means the agent, if compromised or misused, can perform any action available through the Dpd2 API as exposed by Rube, without specific limitations defined within the skill itself. This could include sensitive data access, modification, or deletion, depending on the Dpd2 API's capabilities. Implement granular access controls on the Rube MCP or Dpd2 integration to limit the scope of operations an agent can perform. If possible, define a whitelist of allowed Dpd2 operations within the skill's configuration rather than allowing arbitrary execution of discovered tools. Ensure the Dpd2 connection used by the agent has the principle of least privilege applied. | Static | SKILL.md:43 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/647e47ad32d49ac2)
Powered by SkillShield