Security Audit
dripcel-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
dripcel-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad tool access via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Broad tool access via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill grants the LLM access to `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` for 'Dripcel operations' and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' using `run_composio_tool()`. The specific scope and potential impact of these operations are not defined within the skill, but the names suggest broad automation capabilities. If Dripcel operations include sensitive actions (e.g., data deletion, modification of critical settings, access to PII) or if `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` allows arbitrary code execution, this constitutes excessive permissions for an AI agent. The instruction to 'Always search tools first' means the LLM can dynamically discover and potentially use any tool exposed by Dripcel/Composio, including highly privileged ones, without explicit human review of each specific tool's capabilities. This could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized modifications, or command injection if the underlying tools are misused. 1. Clearly define and restrict the scope of 'Dripcel operations' accessible via `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` to only necessary, low-risk actions. 2. Provide detailed documentation or schema for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()` to clarify its capabilities and ensure it does not allow arbitrary code execution or access to sensitive system resources. If it does, consider removing or severely restricting its availability to the LLM. 3. Implement strict access controls and human approval workflows for sensitive Dripcel operations, even if discovered dynamically by the LLM. | LLM | SKILL.md:68 |
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