Security Audit

dropcontact-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

dropcontact-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Skill provides access to generic Rube MCP tools beyond stated scope.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Skill provides access to generic Rube MCP tools beyond stated scope The skill 'dropcontact-automation' is named and described as automating Dropcontact tasks. However, it exposes generic Rube MCP tools such as `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. These tools allow the execution of any tool available through Rube MCP, not just those specifically related to Dropcontact. This means an LLM using this skill could be prompted to interact with other connected toolkits, leading to excessive permissions beyond the skill's intended scope of 'Dropcontact automation'. Restrict the exposed Rube MCP tools to only those directly related to Dropcontact operations. Alternatively, rename the skill to reflect its broader capability (e.g., 'Rube MCP Automation') and update the description accordingly, making the broader scope explicit to the user. If the intent is truly Dropcontact-only, consider implementing a wrapper that filters `tool_slug` arguments to only allow Dropcontact-specific tools.	LLM	SKILL.md:59

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