Security Audit

emailoctopus-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

emailoctopus-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, Unspecified Rube MCP dependency version.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This tool appears to allow for the execution of arbitrary Composio tools, not just those specific to Emailoctopus. While intended for legitimate bulk operations, this broad capability, if misused by an AI agent, could lead to unintended actions across various integrated services managed by Composio, potentially exceeding the intended scope of the Emailoctopus skill. Ensure the AI agent is strictly constrained to specific tool slugs and arguments when using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` to prevent unintended execution of arbitrary Composio tools. Implement strict validation and authorization checks within the Rube MCP system for `run_composio_tool()` calls to enforce least privilege.	LLM	SKILL.md:80
INFO	Unspecified Rube MCP dependency version The skill manifest declares a dependency on `mcp: ["rube"]`. Without a specified version or pinning mechanism, the skill relies on whatever version of Rube MCP is available. This introduces a supply chain risk, as updates to Rube MCP could introduce breaking changes, vulnerabilities, or malicious code without explicit control by the skill developer or user. If possible, specify a precise version or version range for the `rube` MCP dependency in the manifest to ensure stability and mitigate risks from unexpected changes or vulnerabilities in newer versions. Regularly review and update dependencies.	LLM	SKILL.md

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