Security Audit

eventzilla-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

eventzilla-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and run_composio_tool().

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and run_composio_tool() The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'Remote Workbench' and the function name `run_composio_tool()` strongly suggest a capability to execute arbitrary code or commands within a remote environment. If `run_composio_tool()` is not strictly sandboxed and limited to predefined safe operations, an attacker could potentially leverage this tool through prompt injection to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or compromise the underlying system where the Composio tools are executed. This exposes a broad attack surface. 1. Clarify the exact capabilities and security model of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. 2. If `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary code execution, it should be removed or replaced with a more constrained, purpose-built tool. 3. If it's intended for specific, safe operations, ensure these operations are strictly defined, validated, and sandboxed to prevent command injection. 4. Provide clear documentation on the security implications and limitations of this tool.	LLM	SKILL.md:79

Scan History

Embed Code

[![SkillShield](https://skillshield.io/api/v1/badge/fcc4b10bb8f0c337.svg)](https://skillshield.io/report/fcc4b10bb8f0c337)