Security Audit

fluxguard-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

fluxguard-automation received a trust score of 78/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, Unpinned dependency on 'rube' MCP.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

78%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

100%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill instructs the LLM to use `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and the function `run_composio_tool()` strongly suggest an environment capable of executing arbitrary code or commands. If the arguments to `run_composio_tool()` can be controlled by untrusted input, or if the underlying tool itself is malicious, this could lead to command injection or arbitrary code execution on the host system or within the Rube environment. Clarify the capabilities and security model of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure it operates within a strictly sandboxed environment and does not allow arbitrary code execution or shell commands. If it does, explicitly state the risks and provide mitigation strategies, such as input validation and strict permission controls.	Static	SKILL.md:60
MEDIUM	Unpinned dependency on 'rube' MCP The skill's manifest declares a dependency on the `rube` MCP (`"mcp": ["rube"]`) without specifying a version. This means that any version of the `rube` MCP could be used, including potentially malicious future versions or if the `rube` registry is compromised. This introduces a supply chain risk as the skill's behavior could change unexpectedly or maliciously if the dependency is updated without review. Pin the `rube` MCP dependency to a specific, known-good version (e.g., `"mcp": ["rube@1.2.3"]`) to ensure deterministic and secure behavior. Regularly review and update dependencies to mitigate supply chain risks.	Static	Manifest (frontmatter JSON):3

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