Trust Assessment
gh-fix-ci received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 7 findings: 3 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Dangerous call: subprocess.run(), Broad GitHub CLI Permissions Required.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 10/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 16, 2026 (commit ccf6204f). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings7
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:58 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:68 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:138 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'run_gh_command'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:58 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'run_gh_command_raw'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:68 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'find_git_root'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:138 | |
| INFO | Broad GitHub CLI Permissions Required The skill explicitly states a requirement for the `gh` CLI to be authenticated with 'workflow/repo' scopes. While these permissions are likely necessary for the skill's intended functionality (e.g., fetching detailed logs, potentially creating PRs or re-running workflows in later stages as described in the workflow), they grant broad access to the GitHub repository and its workflows. Users should be aware of the extensive capabilities granted to the agent when using this skill. Ensure that the agent's execution environment and the `gh` CLI are configured with the principle of least privilege. If the skill's functionality can be achieved with narrower scopes, consider reducing them. Clearly communicate the required permissions to the user. | LLM | SKILL.md:10 |
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