Security Audit

github-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

github-automation received a trust score of 81/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad scope of GitHub API access exposes critical and destructive capabilities, Unspecified dependency on external Rube MCP introduces supply chain risk.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

2 findings

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Broad scope of GitHub API access exposes critical and destructive capabilities The skill provides access to a wide range of powerful GitHub API tools, including repository creation/deletion (`GITHUB_CREATE_A_REPOSITORY_FOR_THE_AUTHENTICATED_USER`, `GITHUB_DELETE_A_REPOSITORY`), pull request merging (`GITHUB_MERGE_A_PULL_REQUEST`), collaborator management (`GITHUB_ADD_A_REPOSITORY_COLLABORATOR`), and branch protection modification (`GITHUB_UPDATE_BRANCH_PROTECTION`). While some tools include 'safety' notes, the sheer breadth of these capabilities, if granted to an unconstrained AI agent, presents a significant risk of unauthorized data modification, deletion, privilege escalation, or service disruption. An agent could be prompted to perform destructive actions or bypass intended safeguards. Implement a principle of least privilege for the AI agent's GitHub access. Only grant access to the specific tools and scopes absolutely necessary for its intended function. For highly destructive or sensitive actions, enforce strict human review and approval workflows that cannot be bypassed by the agent. Consider breaking down this monolithic skill into smaller, more granular skills with limited capabilities.	LLM	SKILL.md:100
MEDIUM	Unspecified dependency on external Rube MCP introduces supply chain risk The skill declares a dependency on 'rube' MCP and instructs users to add `https://rube.app/mcp` as an MCP server. There is no version pinning or integrity verification mechanism specified for the Rube MCP server, which introduces a supply chain risk. A compromise of `rube.app` or the Rube MCP system could lead to malicious tools being served to the agent, potentially compromising the agent's operations or data. Specify a version or hash for the Rube MCP endpoint to ensure integrity and prevent unexpected changes. Implement mechanisms to verify the authenticity and integrity of the MCP server before connecting. Regularly audit the external dependency for security vulnerabilities.	LLM	SKILL.md:30

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