Security Audit
griptape-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
griptape-automation received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad Tool Execution Capabilities.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Broad Tool Execution Capabilities The skill grants the LLM broad capabilities to execute arbitrary Griptape tools via `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. While this is the intended functionality of an automation skill, it means that if the LLM is compromised or misused, it could potentially perform a wide range of operations accessible through the connected Griptape toolkit. The scope of actions is limited only by the underlying Griptape tools and the permissions granted to the Rube MCP connection. Implement strict access controls and monitoring on the Griptape toolkit itself. Ensure the LLM's prompts are carefully engineered to prevent unintended tool invocations. Consider implementing human-in-the-loop approvals for sensitive Griptape operations if the underlying tools have high-impact capabilities. | Static | SKILL.md:59 | |
| MEDIUM | Broad Tool Execution Capabilities The skill grants the LLM broad capabilities to execute arbitrary Griptape tools via `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. While this is the intended functionality of an automation skill, it means that if the LLM is compromised or misused, it could potentially perform a wide range of operations accessible through the connected Griptape toolkit. The scope of actions is limited only by the underlying Griptape tools and the permissions granted to the Rube MCP connection. Implement strict access controls and monitoring on the Griptape toolkit itself. Ensure the LLM's prompts are carefully engineered to prevent unintended tool invocations. Consider implementing human-in-the-loop approvals for sensitive Griptape operations if the underlying tools have high-impact capabilities. | Static | SKILL.md:90 |
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