Security Audit

hashnode-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

hashnode-automation received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation suggests using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. Unlike `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` which explicitly states arguments must be 'schema-compliant', there are no mentioned constraints or schema requirements for `run_composio_tool()` within the workbench context. This lack of explicit constraint, combined with the term 'workbench' (implying a flexible execution environment) and 'bulk ops' (often requiring custom logic), suggests a potential for command injection. An LLM, when prompted for 'bulk ops', might generate arbitrary code or commands to pass to `run_composio_tool()` if it interprets the 'workbench' as a permissive execution environment. If `run_composio_tool()` allows the execution of arbitrary code or commands provided by the LLM, it could lead to unauthorized system access, data manipulation, or exfiltration. Clarify the exact capabilities and input constraints of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If it allows arbitrary code execution, implement strict sandboxing and input validation. If it's intended for specific, pre-defined operations, ensure the LLM cannot inject arbitrary commands by providing a clear, restrictive schema for its inputs.	LLM	SKILL.md:76

Scan History

Embed Code

[![SkillShield](https://skillshield.io/api/v1/badge/ed0b99f246ae8404.svg)](https://skillshield.io/report/ed0b99f246ae8404)