Security Audit
helcim-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
helcim-automation received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unpinned MCP dependency, Broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Unpinned MCP dependency The skill's manifest specifies a dependency on the 'rube' MCP without a pinned version. This means the skill could automatically use any version of the Rube MCP, potentially introducing breaking changes or malicious behavior if the MCP provider's infrastructure is compromised or if an undesirable update is pushed. The skill also explicitly points to 'https://rube.app/mcp' as the source, which could be a single point of failure or compromise. Pin the version of the 'rube' MCP in the manifest to ensure deterministic and secure dependency resolution. For example, `"mcp": ["rube@1.2.3"]` or similar versioning scheme if supported by the ecosystem. Additionally, consider implementing integrity checks for external MCP sources. | Static | SKILL.md:5 | |
| MEDIUM | Broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill instructs the agent to use `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' with `run_composio_tool()`. This suggests a powerful and potentially unconstrained execution environment within the Rube MCP. If the underlying `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary or very broad operations on the Helcim account, and the agent is not sufficiently constrained by its own policies, this could lead to excessive permissions being exercised, potentially performing unintended or harmful bulk operations. If possible, define more granular permissions or scope for the `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool within the Rube MCP, or provide clearer instructions to the agent on when and how to use this powerful tool. Agents should be designed with robust authorization checks before executing broad operations. | Static | SKILL.md:70 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/fbcc7c5543328343)
Powered by SkillShield