Security Audit

hypeauditor-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

hypeauditor-automation received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via Remote Workbench.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via Remote Workbench The skill instructs the LLM to use `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' with `run_composio_tool()`. The term 'remote workbench' combined with a function like `run_composio_tool()` strongly suggests a capability to execute arbitrary tools or code within a remote environment. If the arguments passed to `run_composio_tool()` can be controlled by an attacker (e.g., through prompt injection into the LLM), this could lead to arbitrary command execution on the remote workbench, posing a significant command injection vulnerability. The documentation does not specify the security controls or scope of execution within this workbench. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Implement strict input validation and sanitization for any arguments passed to `run_composio_tool()` to prevent arbitrary code or command injection. If `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` allows execution of arbitrary code, consider if this level of access is truly necessary for the skill. If not, restrict its functionality. Ensure the remote workbench environment is isolated and operates with the principle of least privilege.	LLM	SKILL.md:60

Scan History

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