Security Audit

kickbox-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

kickbox-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Vague `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool may allow command injection or excessive permissions.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Vague `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` tool may allow command injection or excessive permissions The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' using `run_composio_tool()`. The term 'workbench' often implies a general-purpose execution environment, which could allow for arbitrary code execution, shell commands, or access to the underlying system beyond the scope of specific, sandboxed tool calls. Without clear documentation on the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`, this presents a significant risk of command injection and excessive permissions. If `run_composio_tool()` itself can execute arbitrary code or system commands, this risk is amplified. Provide explicit documentation for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` detailing its exact capabilities, security boundaries, and whether it allows arbitrary code execution or system commands. If it does, implement strict sandboxing and input validation. If its purpose is solely to execute `composio_tool` functions, rename it to reflect this more limited scope or clarify that it does not provide a general-purpose shell/execution environment.	LLM	SKILL.md:82

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