Security Audit
langbase-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
langbase-automation received a trust score of 72/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Dynamic Tool Execution via Unconstrained External MCP.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Dynamic Tool Execution via Unconstrained External MCP The skill instructs the LLM to dynamically discover and execute tools provided by the 'rube' MCP (rube.app). This means the actual capabilities and permissions of the skill are not fixed but are determined by an external, unversioned service. A malicious or compromised 'rube.app' could introduce tools with arbitrary code execution, data exfiltration, or other harmful capabilities, which the LLM would then be instructed to use via `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` or `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. This constitutes a significant supply chain risk and grants excessive, unconstrained permissions to an external system. 1. **Constrain MCP capabilities**: The skill definition should explicitly list and constrain the specific `tool_slug`s or `use_case`s that are allowed from the `rube` MCP, rather than allowing dynamic discovery and execution of *any* tool. 2. **Version pinning/attestation**: Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity and expected behavior of the `rube` MCP, such as version pinning or cryptographic attestation of the tools it provides. 3. **Least privilege**: Ensure that the `rube` MCP itself operates with the principle of least privilege and that its tools do not offer capabilities beyond what is strictly necessary for Langbase automation. 4. **Sandboxing**: Execute `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` calls within a strictly sandboxed environment to limit potential damage. | LLM | SKILL.md:39 |
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