Security Audit
lessonspace-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
lessonspace-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Excessive Tool Permissions via Generic Rube Execution.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Excessive Tool Permissions via Generic Rube Execution The skill describes the use of generic Rube MCP tools (`RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL`, `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`) for executing operations. While the skill's stated purpose is 'Lessonspace Automation', these underlying Rube tools are generic execution mechanisms. If an agent's reasoning is compromised (e.g., via prompt injection), it could potentially use these tools to execute any function available through the Rube MCP, not just Lessonspace-specific operations, leading to broader permissions than intended for this skill. Implement strict access controls or agent-side guardrails to ensure that `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` are only used to execute Lessonspace-specific tools when operating within the context of this skill. If possible, configure the Rube MCP to limit the scope of tools accessible to this skill's integration. | LLM | SKILL.md:49 | |
| MEDIUM | Excessive Tool Permissions via Generic Rube Execution The skill describes the use of generic Rube MCP tools (`RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL`, `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`) for executing operations. While the skill's stated purpose is 'Lessonspace Automation', these underlying Rube tools are generic execution mechanisms. If an agent's reasoning is compromised (e.g., via prompt injection), it could potentially use these tools to execute any function available through the Rube MCP, not just Lessonspace-specific operations, leading to broader permissions than intended for this skill. Implement strict access controls or agent-side guardrails to ensure that `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` are only used to execute Lessonspace-specific tools when operating within the context of this skill. If possible, configure the Rube MCP to limit the scope of tools accessible to this skill's integration. | LLM | SKILL.md:70 |
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