Security Audit

lexoffice-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

lexoffice-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential for arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential for arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill's 'Quick Reference' section mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' using `run_composio_tool()`. This suggests the capability to execute arbitrary Composio tools within a remote environment. If the `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` is not strictly sandboxed or if `run_composio_tool()` allows execution of tools beyond the scope of Lexoffice automation, it could lead to excessive permissions, allowing an LLM (or an attacker manipulating the LLM) to perform unintended actions, interact with other connected services, or execute commands with broad privileges. Restrict the capabilities of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` to only Lexoffice-specific operations or remove its availability if not strictly necessary for the skill's core function. Ensure the `run_composio_tool()` function within the workbench is strictly sandboxed and only allows whitelisted, safe operations. Provide clear guidance to the LLM on when and how to use this powerful tool, emphasizing its limitations and the specific tools it is allowed to invoke.	LLM	SKILL.md:70

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