Security Audit

mailcoach-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

mailcoach-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Exposure of broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Exposure of broad tool execution capability via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation explicitly references `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This suggests the ability to execute arbitrary Composio tools within the Rube MCP environment. If the underlying Composio ecosystem includes tools with broad permissions (e.g., file system access, arbitrary network requests, or system command execution), an attacker could potentially leverage this capability through prompt injection to the LLM. This could lead to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or arbitrary code execution. While the skill itself does not define the scope of `run_composio_tool()`, its inclusion as a core operation exposes a powerful primitive that requires careful scrutiny. Clarify and restrict the scope of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and only allows execution of explicitly whitelisted and safe Composio tools. If arbitrary tool execution is intended, ensure robust authorization and auditing mechanisms are in place, and clearly document the security implications for users.	LLM	SKILL.md:60

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