Security Audit

ncscale-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

CAUTION

Scanned 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

ncscale-automation received a trust score of 72/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Skill enables arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

70%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
CRITICAL	Skill enables arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation explicitly promotes the use of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The terminology 'workbench' and 'run_composio_tool()' strongly suggests a capability to execute arbitrary Composio tools, potentially with broad and unconstrained permissions. If `run_composio_tool()` allows arbitrary code execution, filesystem access, or network requests, a malicious agent could leverage this to perform command injection, data exfiltration, or other unauthorized actions. The skill itself does not define or restrict the scope of operations possible through this powerful interface. Critically review the implementation and intended capabilities of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If it allows arbitrary code execution, it should be removed or replaced with more granular, permission-controlled operations. If it's intended for specific, safe bulk operations, these should be explicitly defined and not rely on a generic `run_composio_tool()` interface. Implement strict sandboxing and input validation for any code executed within the workbench. Provide clear documentation on the security implications and how to safely use this powerful tool, or ideally, replace it with more granular, permission-controlled operations.	LLM	SKILL.md:75

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