Security Audit

optimoroute-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

optimoroute-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Excessive Permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Potential Excessive Permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation recommends using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This suggests a powerful capability that could allow for broad execution of operations or even arbitrary code within the Composio environment. Without clear restrictions on what `run_composio_tool()` can execute or access, this tool could grant excessive permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data manipulation, or resource access beyond the intended scope of Optimoroute automation. The exact scope of `run_composio_tool()` is not defined within this skill, but its inclusion as a core operation raises concerns about potential over-privilege. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and only allows execution of pre-approved, well-defined, and minimally privileged operations. If it allows arbitrary code execution, this should be explicitly stated and strong warnings about its use should be provided, along with strict access controls.	LLM	SKILL.md:70

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