Security Audit

placid-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

placid-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential arbitrary tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The description of `run_composio_tool()` is vague, but its inclusion in a 'workbench' context suggests it might allow the execution of arbitrary Composio tools or even custom code. If `run_composio_tool()` is not properly sandboxed or allows access to sensitive system functions (e.g., file system, network, shell commands), it could lead to command injection or excessive permissions, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or access unauthorized resources. Clarify the exact capabilities and limitations of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and cannot execute arbitrary shell commands or access sensitive system resources. If it's intended for executing other Composio tools, ensure those tools themselves are secure and their permissions are appropriately scoped. Provide examples of its safe usage and explicit warnings about its potential misuse.	LLM	SKILL.md:79

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