Security Audit
poptin-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
poptin-automation received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Unpinned Dependency in Manifest, Broad Tool Execution Capabilities via Rube MCP.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Unpinned Dependency in Manifest The skill's manifest specifies a dependency on 'rube' without a version constraint. This means that any version of the 'rube' MCP could be used, potentially leading to unexpected behavior, compatibility issues, or the introduction of vulnerabilities if a future version of 'rube' contains breaking changes or malicious code. It's best practice to pin dependencies to specific versions or ranges. Pin the 'rube' dependency to a specific version or a version range (e.g., `"rube@^1.0.0"`) to ensure consistent and predictable behavior and to mitigate risks from unvetted updates. | Static | Manifest:4 | |
| LOW | Broad Tool Execution Capabilities via Rube MCP The skill leverages Rube MCP tools such as `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` (specifically `run_composio_tool()`). These tools, by design, provide the capability to execute a wide range of Composio tools, potentially beyond the explicit 'Poptin Automation' scope of this skill. While the documentation focuses on Poptin, the underlying mechanism grants broad execution permissions. This increases the attack surface if the LLM or the skill's execution context were to be compromised, allowing for actions outside the intended Poptin-specific operations. While inherent to using Rube MCP, consider adding explicit warnings in the skill's documentation about the broad capabilities of `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and emphasize the importance of strictly adhering to the intended Poptin-specific use cases. If possible, explore more granular permission models within Rube MCP or Composio to restrict tool access to only what is necessary for Poptin automation. | Static | SKILL.md:69 |
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