Security Audit

procfu-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 99e2a2951545

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

procfu-automation received a trust score of 84/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unversioned external service dependency, Potentially unconstrained execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potentially unconstrained execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` for 'Bulk ops' using `run_composio_tool()`. Without clear documentation on the sandboxing, input validation, and specific capabilities of `run_composio_tool()`, this tool could allow the LLM to execute arbitrary code or commands within the Composio environment. This represents a significant risk of excessive permissions and potential command injection if the LLM can craft malicious inputs that are then executed by `run_composio_tool()`. Provide explicit documentation on the security model, sandboxing, and input validation for `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Restrict the types of operations or code that can be executed, or ensure strict input sanitization to prevent arbitrary code execution.	LLM	SKILL.md:80
MEDIUM	Unversioned external service dependency The skill declares a dependency on the 'rube' MCP in its manifest without specifying a version. This means the skill's behavior could change if the 'rube' MCP service is updated or altered, potentially introducing breaking changes or security vulnerabilities without the skill author's explicit consent or awareness. Additionally, the skill instructs users to connect to `https://rube.app/mcp`, which is an unversioned endpoint for a critical external service. If possible, specify a version or a more stable, versioned endpoint for the 'rube' MCP. Implement mechanisms to validate the integrity and expected behavior of external services before use.	LLM	SKILL.md:24

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