Security Audit

rippling-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

rippling-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Skill exposes RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH with run_composio_tool(), Unpinned dependency on 'rube' MCP.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

83%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Skill exposes RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH with run_composio_tool() The skill documentation explicitly mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The terms 'workbench' and 'run_composio_tool()' strongly suggest a capability to execute arbitrary code or highly privileged operations within the Composio ecosystem. If `run_composio_tool()` allows execution of arbitrary commands or scripts, it represents a significant command injection vulnerability and excessive permissions, allowing an attacker to potentially execute malicious code on the host system or within the Composio environment. Clarify the exact capabilities and security boundaries of `run_composio_tool()`. If it allows arbitrary code execution, it should be removed or heavily restricted. If it's a controlled API, ensure proper input validation and least privilege principles are applied. Document its security implications clearly to prevent misuse.	LLM	SKILL.md:68
LOW	Unpinned dependency on 'rube' MCP The manifest specifies a dependency on the 'rube' MCP without a version constraint. This means that any version of 'rube' could be used, including potentially vulnerable or malicious future versions if the 'rube' project were compromised. Best practice dictates pinning dependencies to specific versions or ranges to ensure reproducibility and security. Pin the 'rube' MCP dependency to a specific version or a narrow version range (e.g., `{"mcp": ["rube==1.2.3"]}` or `{"mcp": ["rube>=1.0.0,<2.0.0"]}`) in the skill's manifest.	LLM	SKILL.md:1

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