Security Audit

screenshotone-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

screenshotone-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential for excessive permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Potential for excessive permissions via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' often implies an environment capable of executing arbitrary code or commands. If `run_composio_tool()` allows execution of commands beyond the intended scope of Screenshotone operations, or provides access to the underlying filesystem or system resources, this could lead to excessive permissions and potential command injection or data exfiltration. The skill, by recommending its use, implicitly endorses this potentially broad access. Clarify the exact capabilities and security implications of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is sandboxed and restricted to only perform intended operations, preventing arbitrary code execution or unauthorized system access. If arbitrary code execution is an intended feature, this should be explicitly stated and justified with strong security controls.	LLM	SKILL.md:80

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