Security Audit

serpapi-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

serpapi-automation received a trust score of 83/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`, Dependency on external Rube MCP introduces supply chain risk.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Shell Execution

2 findings

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The function name `run_composio_tool()` strongly suggests the ability to execute arbitrary tools or code within the Composio environment. If the LLM can control the arguments passed to this function, it could lead to command injection or arbitrary code execution, granting excessive permissions beyond the intended scope of the skill. Clarify the exact capabilities and sandboxing of `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure it only executes whitelisted, safe operations and that its arguments are strictly validated and sanitized to prevent arbitrary code execution. If it allows arbitrary tool execution, ensure those tools are also sandboxed and their permissions are appropriately constrained.	LLM	SKILL.md:70
MEDIUM	Dependency on external Rube MCP introduces supply chain risk The skill explicitly depends on the `rube` MCP, hosted at `https://rube.app/mcp`. This external dependency introduces a supply chain risk. A compromise of the `rube.app` domain or the Rube MCP service itself could directly impact the security and integrity of this skill and the operations it performs, potentially leading to malicious code execution or data exfiltration. Implement robust validation and monitoring of external MCP services. Users should be made aware of the trust placed in `rube.app` and the potential risks associated with external dependencies. Consider mechanisms for verifying the integrity of the Rube MCP endpoint and its responses.	LLM	SKILL.md:20

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