Security Audit

smartproxy-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

smartproxy-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Broad tool execution via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill's stated purpose is 'Automate Smartproxy tasks'. However, it exposes `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` which, according to the documentation, can execute `run_composio_tool()`. This implies the ability to run any tool available within the broader Composio ecosystem, not just Smartproxy-specific ones. If the Composio ecosystem includes tools with broad capabilities (e.g., filesystem access, arbitrary network requests, or system commands), then exposing `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` via this skill grants the LLM excessive permissions beyond the stated scope of 'Smartproxy automation'. Clarify the scope of `run_composio_tool()` within `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH`. If it is intended to be restricted to Smartproxy tools, this should be explicitly stated and enforced. If it allows arbitrary Composio tools, the skill's description should reflect this broader capability, and the implications for permissions should be clearly documented. Consider if `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` should be exposed in a skill specifically for 'Smartproxy automation' if it grants access to non-Smartproxy tools.	LLM	SKILL.md:80

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