Security Audit

timekit-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

timekit-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Use of RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH with run_composio_tool() grants broad execution capabilities.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Use of RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH with run_composio_tool() grants broad execution capabilities The skill documentation suggests using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This tool implies the ability to execute arbitrary Composio tools or potentially custom code within the Composio environment. If the underlying Composio platform or `run_composio_tool()` is not strictly sandboxed, this could lead to command injection, arbitrary code execution, or access to sensitive resources beyond the intended scope of Timekit operations. This grants excessive permissions to the LLM if it can control the arguments to `run_composio_tool()`. Clarify the exact scope and sandboxing of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. If it allows arbitrary code, consider restricting its availability or providing more constrained alternatives. Ensure robust input validation and execution environment sandboxing for `run_composio_tool()` to prevent command injection and unauthorized access.	LLM	SKILL.md:80

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