Security Audit

tripadvisor-content-api-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

tripadvisor-content-api-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad execution capabilities via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Broad execution capabilities via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation mentions `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. This suggests a powerful execution environment that could allow for arbitrary code execution or highly privileged operations beyond the scope of typical API interactions. If `run_composio_tool()` can execute arbitrary commands or access system resources, it represents a significant command injection and excessive permissions risk. The skill does not define the scope or sandboxing of `run_composio_tool()`, making its potential impact unclear but potentially dangerous. Clarify the exact capabilities and security boundaries of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` is strictly sandboxed and limited to safe, predefined operations. If it allows arbitrary code execution, it should be flagged as a critical command injection risk and either removed or its usage severely restricted and documented with explicit security warnings.	LLM	SKILL.md:73

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