Security Audit

typless-automation

github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skills

AI SkillCommit 27904475d127

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

typless-automation received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH The skill documentation suggests using `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` with `run_composio_tool()` for 'Bulk ops'. The term 'workbench' and the function name `run_composio_tool()` imply the ability to execute arbitrary code or commands within the Composio environment. If the arguments passed to `run_composio_tool()` are not strictly validated and sanitized, a malicious actor could inject commands, leading to arbitrary code execution, data exfiltration, or system compromise. This represents a significant command injection and excessive permissions risk, as the exact capabilities and security model of this powerful tool are not detailed. 1. Clarify the exact capabilities and security model of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` and `run_composio_tool()`. 2. Ensure that `run_composio_tool()` strictly validates and sanitizes all input arguments to prevent command injection. 3. Implement strong sandboxing and least privilege principles for the execution environment of `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` to limit potential damage from malicious commands. 4. Provide clear warnings about the power of this tool and best practices for its secure use.	LLM	SKILL.md:60

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