Security Audit
Uploadcare Automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
Uploadcare Automation received a trust score of 81/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Excessive Permissions: Broad File Download Access, Supply Chain Risk: Unpinned External MCP Server Dependency.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 27904475). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Excessive Permissions: Broad File Download Access The `UPLOADCARE_GET_FILE_DOWNLOAD_URL` tool allows generating temporary download links for any file in the Uploadcare project, given its UUID. This broad access to file content, without apparent granular permissions or restrictions within the skill's definition, poses a significant risk. A compromised LLM could be prompted to generate download links for sensitive files, leading to unauthorized data exfiltration. Implement more granular access control for file download capabilities, if possible, or ensure the LLM's access to file UUIDs is strictly controlled and audited. Consider adding a confirmation step or restricting download link generation to specific file types or user roles. | LLM | SKILL.md:86 | |
| MEDIUM | Supply Chain Risk: Unpinned External MCP Server Dependency The skill explicitly depends on an external MCP server (`https://rube.app/mcp`) as declared in the manifest and setup instructions. This introduces a supply chain risk, as the integrity and security of the skill are reliant on this third-party service. A compromise of the `rube.app` server could lead to malicious code execution or data manipulation within the skill's environment. The absence of version pinning or integrity checks for the MCP server means its behavior could change without notice. Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity and authenticity of external MCP servers. Consider pinning to specific versions or hashes of the MCP server if the platform allows, or using trusted, audited MCP providers. Evaluate the trust model and security practices of `rube.app`. | LLM | SKILL.md:23 |
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