Security Audit
yandex-automation
github.com/ComposioHQ/awesome-claude-skillsTrust Assessment
yandex-automation received a trust score of 95/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Broad access to Yandex operations via generic execution tools.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 17, 2026 (commit 99e2a295). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Broad access to Yandex operations via generic execution tools The skill utilizes `RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` and `RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH` which allow the agent to perform a wide range of Yandex operations. While the skill advises discovering tools via `RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS`, it does not inherently restrict the scope of operations an agent can perform once connected to a Yandex account. This grants broad access to Yandex resources, limited only by the permissions of the connected Yandex account. An agent with this skill could potentially perform sensitive or destructive actions if not properly constrained by the orchestrating LLM. Implement stricter access controls or fine-grained permissions within the Rube MCP or Composio toolkit, or provide specific, limited-scope sub-skills for common Yandex tasks instead of a single broad automation skill. The orchestrating LLM should be carefully prompted to limit the scope of operations. | LLM | SKILL.md:60 |
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