Security Audit

backend-to-frontend-handoff-docs

github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates

AI SkillCommit 458b11867eae

TRUSTED

Scanned 11 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

backend-to-frontend-handoff-docs received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Dynamic File Path for Write Operation.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

91%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings3

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4
MEDIUM	Dynamic File Path for Write Operation The skill instructs the agent to write a file to a path that includes a dynamic component (`<feature-name>`). If the `<feature-name>` is derived from untrusted user input and not properly sanitized by the platform, it could lead to path traversal vulnerabilities, allowing files to be written outside the intended directory. Ensure that the platform executing the file write operation sanitizes the `<feature-name>` component to prevent path traversal (e.g., by removing `../` sequences) or strictly sandboxes the write operation to the intended directory, restricting writes only within the designated `.claude/docs/ai/` directory.	LLM	SKILL.md:34
LOW	Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4

Scan History

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