Security Audit

busybox-on-windows

github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates

AI SkillCommit 458b11867eae

TRUSTED

Scanned 11 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

busybox-on-windows received a trust score of 75/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Unverified executable download from third-party source.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

91%

Static Code Analysis

85%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

100%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

2 findings

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Security Findings3

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Unverified executable download from third-party source The skill instructs the user to download an executable (`busybox.exe`, `busybox64.exe`, `busybox64u.exe`, `busybox64a.exe`) from a third-party domain (`https://frippery.org/files/busybox/`) using `Invoke-WebRequest`. This source is not the official BusyBox website (`busybox.net`), and no cryptographic hashes (e.g., SHA256) are provided to verify the integrity or authenticity of the downloaded files. If the third-party server is compromised or the files are tampered with, the user could unknowingly download and execute malicious code, leading to system compromise. 1. Provide cryptographic hashes (e.g., SHA256) for all downloadable BusyBox variants and instruct the user to verify the hash after download. 2. Consider hosting the executables on a more trusted or official domain, or provide instructions for building BusyBox from source. 3. Clearly state the risks associated with downloading and executing unverified executables from third-party sources.	Static	SKILL.md:14
MEDIUM	Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4
LOW	Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4

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