Trust Assessment
clickhouse-io received a trust score of 62/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, SQL Injection Vulnerability in Example Code.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | SQL Injection Vulnerability in Example Code The provided TypeScript code snippets for data insertion demonstrate a critical SQL injection vulnerability. Values from the `Trade` object (e.g., `trade.id`, `trade.market_id`, `trade.user_id`, `trade.amount`, `trade.timestamp`) are directly concatenated into the SQL `INSERT` query string without proper sanitization or parameterization. If any of these values originate from untrusted user input, an attacker could inject malicious SQL commands, leading to data manipulation, unauthorized access, or data loss (e.g., `DROP TABLE`). This pattern is explicitly shown as '✅ Batch insert (efficient)' which promotes an insecure coding practice. Modify the example code to use parameterized queries or a client library's safe insertion methods instead of string concatenation. Most database drivers provide mechanisms to safely bind parameters to queries, which prevents SQL injection. For ClickHouse, this typically involves passing an array of objects or values to the `insert` method, allowing the driver to handle proper escaping. | LLM | SKILL.md:130 | |
| MEDIUM | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4 | |
| LOW | Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4 |
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