Security Audit

frontend-to-backend-requirements

github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates

AI SkillCommit 458b11867eae

TRUSTED

Scanned 11 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

frontend-to-backend-requirements received a trust score of 83/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Potential Path Traversal in File Output.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

91%

Static Code Analysis

93%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

100%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings3

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4
MEDIUM	Potential Path Traversal in File Output The skill instructs the AI to write output to a file path that includes a dynamic, user-controlled component (`<feature-name>`). If the AI framework does not properly sanitize the `<feature-name>` input, an attacker could inject path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`, `/`) to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem outside the intended `.claude/docs/ai/` directory. This could lead to overwriting critical files, creating malicious files, or denial of service. Ensure that any user-provided input used in file paths, such as `<feature-name>`, is strictly sanitized to prevent path traversal characters (e.g., `..`, `/`, `\`). The file writing mechanism should also enforce writing only within the designated output directory, regardless of the provided path.	Static	SKILL.md:10
LOW	Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4

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