Trust Assessment
Hook Development received a trust score of 60/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Command Injection in test-hook.sh utility script.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in test-hook.sh utility script The `test-hook.sh` utility script, designed to test other hook scripts, is vulnerable to command injection. The `$HOOK_SCRIPT` variable, which can contain user-controlled input (the path to the hook script being tested), is unquoted when executed within a `bash -c` command. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands by crafting a malicious `HOOK_SCRIPT` path containing shell metacharacters. Modify line 150 in `scripts/test-hook.sh` to properly quote or pass the `$HOOK_SCRIPT` variable as a separate argument to `bash -c` to prevent shell metacharacter interpretation. A robust solution would be to use `bash -c` with positional parameters. For example: `output=$(timeout "$TIMEOUT" bash -c 'cat "$1" | "$2"' _ "$TEST_INPUT" "$HOOK_SCRIPT" 2>&1)` This ensures that both `$TEST_INPUT` and `$HOOK_SCRIPT` are treated as literal strings and not interpreted as shell commands. | Static | scripts/test-hook.sh:150 | |
| MEDIUM | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4 | |
| LOW | Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4 |
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