Trust Assessment
Plugin Settings received a trust score of 62/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Command Injection in `parse-frontmatter.sh` via unescaped field name.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 11, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in `parse-frontmatter.sh` via unescaped field name The `scripts/parse-frontmatter.sh` utility script directly interpolates the user-provided `FIELD` argument into `grep` and `sed` commands without proper escaping. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary regex metacharacters or `sed` commands, potentially leading to command execution or unexpected behavior.
Specifically, the `sed "s/${FIELD}: *//"` command is vulnerable. If `FIELD` contains `sed` delimiters (e.g., `/`) or the `e` flag, it can lead to arbitrary command execution. For example, if `FIELD` is crafted as `foo/e /bin/sh`, the `sed` command would become `s/foo/e /bin/sh: *//`, which could execute `/bin/sh`. Escape the `FIELD` variable before using it in `grep` and `sed` patterns. For `grep`, use `grep -F` for fixed string matching. For `sed`, escape special characters or use a different delimiter for the `s` command and ensure the field name is properly escaped for that delimiter. A safer approach would be to use a dedicated YAML parsing library (e.g., `yq`) if available, which handles such escaping automatically. | LLM | scripts/parse-frontmatter.sh:49 | |
| MEDIUM | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4 | |
| LOW | Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4 |
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